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RICHARD HILL 
In January 1843 two scandals rocked the Wel-
lington settlement. Chief Police Magistrate 
Michael Murphy was forced to resign his posi-
tion as Wellington's head of police. He had been 
accused, among other things, of cheating at cards 
in the exclusive Wakefield Club, which he al-
most certainly had not. At about the very same 
time his counterpart at the overflow settlement 
of Wanganui, Gilbert Dawson, was drummed 
out of his job too, on the basis of similarly dubi-
ous accusations that he had made homosexual 
advances to constables just before his own wed-
ding. Neither men were angels, but other offi-
cials survived worse accusations I 
Examining the real causes of these two scan-
dals, which wrecked the careers of important state offi-
cials, will provide some clues as to the dynamics of a 
power struggle for the control of the new colony in its 
Dependency and early Crown Colony periods. The very 
significant role played by policing as a prerogative of the 
state will be highlighted. Three rival centres of power-
the Crown, the New Zealand Company and Maori- vied 
with each other during an initial struggle. Out of that 
struggle the Crown emerged victorious, but in the proc-
ess it modified its methodologies of social and racial con-
trol as a result of pressures from the other two centres of 
power. 
First of all, a word about policing. In the final analysis, 
the function of the police - as agents of the ruling powers 
- is to use non-negotiably coercive force upon the popu-
lace. It is the task of the state to ensure, in the phrase used 
in the Treaty of Waitangi, 'Peace and Good Order'. The 
control of society, the Government's ability to impose or 
safeguard 'peace and tranquillity', comprises the most 
important of state functions. On a continuum of the nu-
merous types of state controls over its citizens, ranging 
from a pole of extreme coercion through to the opposite 
pole of hegemonic control (of the way people think, and 
therefore behave), the police range far and wide. In most 
circumstances the police comprise the most significant 
state weapon of social control. In their monitoring of civil 
order around the clock, they act as the eyes and ears of 
Te Aro flat, Wellington, 1842. This was one of the areas from 
which beats had been withdrawn by 1852, because of lack of 
resources. Sketch by William Mein Smith. Alexander 
Turnbtill Library. 
those who govern. They aim at ubiquitous surveillance 
over the population; the knowledge they gain is a prereq-
uisite for efficient and successful 'order and good govern-
ance'. 
The strategic type of coercion they apply to the citizenry 
along the continuum from condign through benign to 
hegemonic control, depends mostly upon the type of soci-
ety or section of society to be policed. Colonial societies of 
immigrants recently released from the types of social con-
trol built up over the centuries in their 'old country' re-
quire a strong degree of coercion. So do colonised peo-
ples, most of whom resist colonisation to a greater or 
lesser degree. Post-colonial societies that have 'stabilised' 
populations of coloniser and colonised peoples require a 
much lesser degree of coercive control. In short, in a 
colony such as New Zealand there is a general move in 
policing strategy from imposing order towards maintain-
ing a relatively acceptable state of order that has emerged 
as a result of socioeconomic development and other fac-
tors, as well as from the previous use of overtly coercive 
control.' 
TRIPARTITE POWER STRUGGLES 
In the first years of the New Zealand colony, police were 
at the forefront of the state's function of imposing at least 
minimum standards of behaviour upon the populace, both 
pakeha and those Maori within the purview of the Crown's 
coercive apparatus based at the scattered official settle-
ments. In the greater Wellington region the magnitude of 
this task was in one sense alleviated by close control of 
the immigrants by the New Zealand Company's local 
leadership and its milieu of wealthy and powerful 'gen-
tlemen'. But the strong presence of the Company power 
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centre also actually created a special problem of order for 
the Crown, one related to the third power centre in the 
region- the chiefs and their people. 
The major task for the Crown in the early years of the 
settlement was that of imposing official British concepts 
of 'order and decorum' upon Maori; of ensuring 'correct' 
modes of behaviour and ultimately of thought by Maori; 
and of, through Europeanisation, getting the tribes to 
relinquish their land in sizeable quantities to the pakeha. 
Most pakeha authorities, Government and Company, 
wanted 'amalgamation' of the two races. This really meant 
assimilation by an allegedly 'superior' race of an alleg-
edly ' inferior' one, the subsuming of the one beneath the 
other and eventually even the total absorption of Maori 
culture by that of the pakeha. The clash between the two 
pakeha power structures came about over the pace of this 
process of 'civilising' the Maori, of supplanting Maori 
law and customs by British law and customs - and, 
relatedly, of getting pakeha onto Maori land, most of 
which was seen as under-utilised or even 'waste'. 
The New Zealand Company regarded this process as 
'cultivating a moral wilderness' that, objectively speak-
ing, wanted to be cultivated: most 'barbarous' people 
would, if it were rapidly thrust upon them, quickly see 
the benefits of Europeanisation and wish to avail them-
selves of it. Those recalcitrants among them who did not, 
would need to be forced into obedience, if necessary down 
the barrel of a gun. Capitalist exploitation of the resources 
of the new colony, and the advance of' civilisation' among 
Maori which underpinned this, should not be impeded by 
any resistance. All, including Maori, would benefit from 
the full and immediate creation in the antipodes of a 
Wakefieldian settlement comprising a happy mixture of 
property holders (including rangatira) and workers 
(pakeha and Maori) . 
The Crown and its policing apparatus shared the same 
ultimate aim of subjugating and 'amalgamating' Maori, 
and getting their land 'opened up' to the European. But 
being !asked with 'peace and good order' throughout the 
country caused the state to take a more cautious approach 
to the colony's tangata whenua, who overwhelmingly 
held the balance of military power. There was 
a cogent fear within the state of race warfare. 
The tangled tribal dynamics of the Welling-
ton area made caution all the more necessary, 
as it was not possible to conclude a modus 
vivendi with a single Maori power grouping. 
When Police Magistrate Dawson arrived 
in Wanganui in September 1841 he found the 
immigrants trying to force their way onto 
unpurchased land. The local tribespeople, not 
yet differentiating Crown from Company, told 
him: 'You may take our land, but you shall 
break our necks first'. Even had Dawson 
wanted to break necks, he scarcely had the 
capacity to do so. The local pakeha numbered dozens 
rather than hundreds; Dawson had a handful of consta-
bles, no troops. He, Chief Police Magistrate Murphy in 
Wellington and other officials repeatedly stressed to the 
Company power centre that the European presence was 
as yet too fragile for there to be anything but a gradual 
incorporation of Maori into the socioeconomic rhythms 
desired by the pakeha men of wealth and influence run-
ning the state and the Company. If the Maori power cen-
tres were negotiated with and the hapu and iwi given (at 
least in the eyes of ethnocentric officials of the early 1840s) 
a fair deal, Maori would cooperate and even assist with 
the process of securing 'peace and tranquillity'. 
New Zealand's future prosperity, Murphy stressed, 
'depends quite as much on the attention paid to [Maori) 
interests, as to a continued introduction of emigrants'. He 
would 'use my utmost power and influence to prevent 
the slightest wrong being done to the Natives' . Anything 
else would have been unwise in view of the huge dispar-
ity of the two populations and their resources; for a start, 
Maori fed the new settlements. But the new settlers, im-
bued with both ethnocentric superiority and a desire to 
get onto land they had been promised by the Company, 
and backed by the Company leadership, paid scant re-
gard to Maori and therefore Crown sensitivities·' 
The constables of the Wellington region were active in 
attempting to prevent and suppress provocation towards 
Maori: refusing to allow violation of wahi tapu areas, 
trying to get settlers to fence their livestock so that it 
would not trample the unfenced Maori cultivations, and 
declining to listen to clamour to arrest Ngatitoa chief Te 
Rangihaeata for destroying houses erected on land at 
Porirua that had never been sold to the Company. The 
root cause of such problems was that the Company's land 
purchases had been ·far too few for the number of settlers 
it had brought out; and that, anyway, many of the pur-
Above: Thorndon flat , Wellington, 1841. The large unfenced 
building contains the police station, post office, church, and 
courthouse and was popularly called the "barn-of-all work". 
Anonymous sketch, Welling ton Public Library. 
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chases were dubious ones which- taking the most chari-
table interpretation- did not take into account inter- and 
intra-tribal complexities. The police needed, on behalf of 
the state, to mediate very carefully between the Company 
and tribal leaderships. The Company claimed that Crown 
impediments to its efforts to get its clients rapidly onto 
the land had encouraged Maori resistance; that with.out the 
interventions of officialdom and its policing agents, Maori 
would quickly realise that their best future lay with as-
sisting the rapid Europeanisation of the colony; that Brit-
ish codes of law and behaviour were superior.' 
As it was, the state did believe that Maori needed to 
have British mores imposed upon them: it was all a mat-
ter of timing. The police were attempting to encourage 
chiefs in and near the settlements to influence their fol-
lowers to adopt pakeha ways of seeing and doing. But it 
was of necessity as yet a delicate business: imposition by 
coaxing and cajoling rather than by coercion. For it was 
clear that Maori authority constituted, like the Company, 
another arena of rival sovereignty. Indeed, there is evi-
dence to suggest that Maori believed that the promise of 
rangatiratanga in the second article of the Treaty of Wait-
angi preserved both chiefly authority and the Maori way 
of life insofar as they wished this to continue; that Maori 
sovereignty could coexist with that of the Crown. For 
now, particularly given the huge population discrepan-
cies, officials tried to persuade the chiefs that a regulated 
movement from customary mores and modes towards 
'Britishness' was not incompatible with retention of their 
tribal authority base. In this way there should emerge, in 
the words of a police official, 'the quiet possession of the 
land by the Settlers' .5 
In the earliest years of the colony the Crown saw 
nothing else as being viable; given the lack of coercive 
Crown resources, the process of turning its nominal sov-
ereignty over the Maori into substantive sovereignty could 
only come about through suasion• For their part, while 
the chiefs apparently saw their own sovereignty as guar-
anteed by the Crown in the Treaty, they were generally 
prepared to cooperate to a greater or lesser degree in 
reaching a modus vivendi with the Crown and the set-
tlers. It suited Maori to participate in the colonial economy, 
in particular. Police chiefs Murphy and Dawson both re-
ported in 1842 that Maori of the Wellington region were 
'inclining very visibly from month to month more to-
wards habits of industry, cleanliness and civilization'.' 
The warrior chiefs of Ngatitoa, Te Atiawa and other 
tribal groupings did not attempt to repel the pakeha from 
their shores, which they could have done, because at the 
time it did not suit them to do so. This the police and 
other state authorities understood, but the Company lead-
ers and settlers generally did not. In their ethnocentric 
contempt for the martial and other abilities of the Maori 
they jeopardised steady progress towards an accommo-
dation of Crown and Maori sovereignties, in the process 
threatening to unleash race warfare at a time when the 
Crown was ill prepared for it- and challenging the very 
foundations of the Crown's sovereign right by dint of 
annexation to regulate control of public order. 
The Company had in effect attempted to assert itself 
as a sovereign entity when its first settlers arrived in Port 
Nicholson [Wellington Harbour) in January 1840, an ef-
fort viewed by the New South Wales authorities as being 
'in opposition to the authority of Her Majesty'. When 
Lieutenant-Governor William Hobson sent his top offi-
cial, together with troops and New South Wales mounted 
police, down to Port Nicholson that May, he did so pri-
marily to establish a very clear constitutional position: 
there could be only one source of sovereign authority in 
New Zealand. To reinforce the point, soon after the expe-
dition landed a very strong local police was recruited 
under the auspices of the New South Wales institution of 
the Police Magistracy, and the previous Company-con-
trolled force was disbanded. The Wellington settlers, who 
took pride in the fact that unlike New South Wales theirs 
was a 'free' colony, were horrified to see heavily armed 
New South Wales and Police Magistracy constables os-
tentatiously patrolling their streets.' 
Founding Police Magistrate Murphy reported 'strong 
hostility' among Wellington pakeha towards Hobson's 
northern governing establishment, but after ·a shaky start 
the Company elite had a cordial enough relationship with 
him: Murphy was socially of their ilk, and as one who 
shared their general aspirations he was considered to be 
'a gentleman who has the true interest of the colony at 
heart'. Wanganui's Police Magistrate Dawson had tried 
his hardest to persuade local chiefs to let settlers onto the 
land pending a final outcome to the disputes, and was 
similarly accorded a place in the ranks of the fledgling 
colonial elite of the 'southern settlements' despite his ar-
rogant and overbearing personality. Murphy was even 
courted for a senior Company post in 1842 by none other 
than Principal Company Agent William Wakefield, who 
testified that the chief of police had been his 'coadjutor 
and support in every measure I have considered benefi-
cial to the settlement and the Company which he could, 
consistently with his official capacity, countenance'. 
But the phrase consistently with his official capacity was 
the clue to why he and Dawson lost their careers as a 
result of Companycpropagated scandals. Their positions 
as the local representatives of state meant that they could 
not accept the New Zealand Company's assessment that 
'prospects of Security and wealth' in the new colony de-
pended upon 'the increasing power of the Company'. As 
state officials tasked with 'order and regularity' through-
out the region they believed the actions of the Company's 
staff and immigrants towards the Maori power centre 
often to be foolishly provocative. The Company did not 
heed their warnings: 'The hostility of the local Govern-
ment must either give way or be removed.' When the 
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officials failed to 'give way' and effect rapid settlement of 
the land whatever the dangers, the Company worked to 
remove them, determined to make it 'a matter of history 
that the Government were in the habit of employing the 
vilest characters in situations of trust and responsibility' .• 
It is true that neither of them was above reproach. 
Murphy, for example, had been sending one of his consta-
bles out on the beat every night so that he could join the 
man's wife in bed- at some cost to his physical wellbeing 
when the constable discovered the affair. But the Wakefield 
family itself was scarcely beyond reproach in such mat-
ters, given its propensity for running off with nubile young 
heiresses . Moreover, the police chiefs' warnings proved 
tragically prophetic a few months after their disgraced 
exit from officialdom. It was a Police Magistrate, suc-
cumbing to settler pressures to get quickly onto the land 
whatever the opposition from Maori, who led a tragic 
expedition from the Company settlement at Nelson in an 
attempt to arrest Ngatitoa's leaders at the Wairau. 10 Yet 
even with 22 settlers, policemen and officials dead as a 
result of the ensuing battle, and few state coercive forces 
available, Company settlers sought an attempt at puni-
tive action against Ngatitoa and were infuriated when 
this was vetoed by the Crown. 'There never was a more 
ignorant, extravagant and dangerous exhibition of the 
folly of despising your enemy' commented the Protector 
of Aborigines. 
Despite the Wellingtonians' flailing of Murphy's suc-
cessors, A E McDonogh and Mathew Richmond (who was 
soon to gain even greater powers as Superintendent of the 
Southern Division), the police officials continued to apply 
the old policing maxim regarding 'the wisdom of caution' 
when dealing with resistant indigenous populations of 
size and strength. In the event this proved to be effica-
cious for the development of the settlement. The two 
officials, with the support of the new Governor Robert 
FitzRoy and particularly after the investigations of Land 
Claims Commissioner William Spain, were able to make 
meaningful moves towards getting greater pakeha access 
to the land by working on compromises between Maori 
and Company. The Crown even attempted to reduce fric-
tion with the leading southern settlers by the tactic of 
'incorporation' - appointing police and judicial officials 
from among the Company elite in Wellington (Henry St 
Hill) and Wanganui (Samuel King). 
This was a move not without its dangers given the 
degree of reprogramming 'poacher into gamekeeper' that 
was needed. St Hill, for example, had been a member of 
the 'government' the Company had set up in rivalry to 
the Crown in 1840 and had been known for 'hot 
headedness' during earlier Maori scares. However the 
new bur ea ucra ts and the several other officials tasked 
with imposing 'order and regularity' in the Southern Di-
vision did work hard as brokers between the other two 
power centres and helped secure a land deal with Ngatitoa 
in 1844. But when this proved to be a considerably smaller 
step than believed- officials had underestimated both the 
degree to which Ngatitoa held tangata whenua status in 
the Wellington area, and the complexity of rights between 
various hapu and iwi - the reprogrammers came to give 
some credence to views amongst the milieu from which 
the new state agents had emerged. The sacking of Russell 
and the ensuing northern war added fuel to such beliefs. 
By the end of 1845, Spain had reported on the validity 
of the Company's purchases of Maori land. Even though 
extra payments for Maori had been wrung from a reluc-
tant New Zealand Company, tribespeople continued to 
work farmlands believed to have been purchased, some 
of these after recently negotiated settlements. During the 
year Richmond and others had been coming to believe 
that, while negotiated agreements with the Maori re-
mained the best way forward, their achievement and / or 
implementation required a demonstration of military 
might. Crown officials were even coming to support the 
Company view that counteractive measures against Maori 
might justifiably include moving pakeha onto lands that 
had clearly never been sold by any tribe or sub-tribe, 
knowing that this risked war. 
In the event armed confrontation in the south arose 
from a string of events in the north. The war waged by 
sections of Ngapuhi had demanded an expensive invest-
ment in imperial military resources, and George Grey 
was selected as a Governor able and willing to efficiently 
superintend the suppression of 'rebels'. Moreover, now 
that warfare had broken out and troops were stationed in 
the colony, the state had less imperative to accommodate 
the effective continuance of indigenous sovereignty in 
areas where this would impede settlement. Grey, in fact, 
was an imperial expert in the theory and practice of rap-
idly forcing 'civilisation' upon subject races, of subjecting 
them to the full panoply of British laws and official mo-
res .. If necessary, 'order and regularity' as the Crown un-
derstood and desired it would be imposed by force of 
arms. This new imperative coincided with the increas-
ingly revisionist views of Superintendent Richmond and 
his fellow Wellington officials, and troops were soon avail-
able for use in the region. 
But (expensive and disruptive) military subjugation 
of what was perceived as a rival sovereignty was never 
intended to be more than a short-term means to a greater 
goal of peaceful race coexistence, albeit on Crown terms. 
What would replace subjugation as a means of socio-
racial control? The Police Magistracy forces in the Wel-
lington region had been able to keep order in the earliest 
years of the settlement but were decreasingly able to con-
trol even the pakeha in and around the settlements. In 
particular, Company control over its immigrants had 
greatly lessened as a result of its inability to fulfil its 
promises to them, and in any case non-Company 'men of 
desperate character and irreclaimably criminal habits' had 
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drifted in and created problems for the relatively unso-
phisticated control measures of the constables. Moreover 
police numbers were low. In 1842 the Chief Constable of 
the Wellington urban area (2,600 people) had 13 subordi-
nate constables; that of Wanganui had three. In the sense 
of town policing this was a very high percentage of police 
to population. But these 16 and their superiors were also 
tasked with coverage of the entire southern North Island, 
bauchery and disorderly behaviour from Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield's son Jerningham and his circle). After a police 
establishment was set up and the constables applied con-
dign force to the problem, offending virtually ceased for a 
time. The only recent offender in November 1841, the 
Police Magistrate reported, was the Sergeant of Police 
himself- who was sacked for being drunk and riotous on 
duty. 
as best as they were able ." 
Ironically, the ultimate coercers 
NORTH ISLAND, 1840- 53 Draconian police methods reflected the raw-
ness of colonial society. The Magistracy P?lice were 
untrained in the law or anything else to do with 
their job, which was regarded as an ephemeral occu-
pation until something better came up. They were 
available to the Crown, soldiers, cre-
ated some of the biggest problems 
for the police given their propensity 
to consume alcohol more prodigiously 
than ordinary colonials - which was 
prodigious enough by anyone's stand-
ards- and thereby produce public disor-
der. This problem intensified when Grey's 
suppression of southern tribes commenced. 
Right through the Crown Colony period, in 
fact, soldiers stationed in and around Welling-
often on pay lower than that of a day labourer. It was 
tempting for them to supplement their pay by means 
that had little regard to niceties. If they brought in a 
drunk they did not get a reward. If they brought 
in a man who was later convicted for being 
J... drunk and disorderly they did, so many a 
ro '6,._.,. ~ drunk was taunted or otherwise 
t)""~~· provoked by constables into ton were said to have 'drunken, quarrelsome and .__H..._. ( :iE>STCAPE disorderly behaviour. Their su-
x." 1848-53 
thieving habits'. Other sectors of society .;:,$ ~ """"""" periors tended to turn a blind 
also caused disproportionate trouble. Whal- ,_ to>~£ [A:. r.,.. eye: the main problem of order in 
ers, for example, after a good season when.,... AHC<IR ~'?"" urban society was a result of drunk-
they sought to spend up large on alcohol '·--,:.?:_ __ __1 __ ~_:-"...., en~e~s, ~nd a bit of creative police 
:'h~nwao:U:'~r:dh:~e:: :;::r d:s~:~t::::n ··~:.r~-~~r'!-PU"<JAAUtN go:;:;~~ ~c::; :::::~ ~fr~h:k~::;:: 
,::::::::. ~ 
would descend on town, with obv1[1~ . ~~~ could be tolerated. 12 
ous consequences. """""' y= But too much transgression would 
Locking offenders up in the \. · y ,... impair the task of the Crown to !m-
primitive and overcrowded gaol ~ £.11 1848-53 pose increasingly high behavwural re-
was scarcely very efficacwus. In ~ s -c..,. quirements upon the populace. As 
a typical gaol escape in 1843, six ~ ~ with the fate of the Wanganui sergeant, 
prisoners violently overpowered to> "-1 so Murphy reported of the region's 
all four police in the vicinity and / l9and --- ~;o..~;r- constables that he was 'obliged for 
~~~;:~:~e:!~et~=:~:~~::~;::: -~ them' . The Governo:~~~~~:~:sc::s:::~e:0 i~h:~:~ 
that all police were off hunting them about oppressive behaviour by police that he decreed 
and unavailable for street duty. Police could not guaran-
tee the safety of informants in gaol; a sergeant had to put 
one such prisoner up in his own house for 10 weeks to 
protect him, itself a disruption to his policing routines. 
The colonial elite, when themselves subjected to po-
lice attention for drunkenness and riotousness, would 
accuse the constables of 'committing the most unpro-
voked and unnecessary aggressions upon the inhabit-
ants'. But given the type of individuals and groups the 
constables were usually dealing with, generally the set-
tlers approved of what were by modern standards very 
rough policing methods. Before a Police Magistracy force 
was established in Wanganui, for example, much robbing 
and pilfering was reported (as well as drunkenness, de-
Above: From Policing the Colonial Frontier, Richard Hill . 
that 'firearms must not be placed in the hands of consta-
bles except on pressing occasions' ." By May 1845, how-
ever, the police were in a bind on such matters. Retrench-
ment arising from state financial difficulties had so re-
duced their numbers that those left had frequently to 
resort to main force to overbear or overwhelm an of-
fender. Sometimes even this was inadequate: when Chief 
Constable Burgess Sayer and a boatload of his constables 
tried to prevent the former proprietor of Barretts Hotel 
fleeing an embezzlement charge in an American brigan-
tine, the boarding party was repelled with armed force 
and had to watch helplessly as the ship sailed out of Port 
Nicholson. Even if he had taken his entire force, the result 
would have been the same. 
As 1846 neared, Wellington and the Hutt had a popu-
lation approaching 4500 (including well over 500 Maori). 
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Yet their authorised strength of NCOs and men had fallen 
to five men. The chief of police felt that this was 'barely 
sufficient to efficiently perform the duties of the Town 
and district', let alone provide (usually reactive) police 
coverage for the rest of the southern North Island - par-
tic~larly given that Wanganui's police establishment now 
comprised a single constable. The addition of two extra 
policemen after a spate of disturbances in the town was of 
little comfort to the Wellington authorities, particularly 
as the possibility of race warfare loomed." 
IMPOSED CONTROL 
By now Governor Grey had in effect decided that time 
was apposite for the Crown to link with the Company 
power centre against that of resistant Maori. He had ar-
rived in February 1846 with 500 military to begin the 
process of dominating and if necessary suppressing 'rebel' 
Maori. He quickly turned his attention to the police. The 
Police Magistracy system had been imported into the 
colony to provide control of a situation in which settle-
ment was small and nucleated. Grey's plan to force 'civili-
sation' on Maori required moving actual state power well 
out of the settlement environs. Seven ill-trained consta-
bles based in Wellington to 'watch a tract of forest coun-
try, without roads, more than a hundred miles in length, 
and to control about five thousand Europeans and many 
thousand savages' was (he agreed with the Wellington 
police leadership) manifestly inadequate to 'ensure the 
permanent tranquillity and welfare of this country' once 
refractory Maori had been conquered. 
In fact Grey's new police would be a sizeable semi-
military body that would be able to actually participate in 
the suppressioJI of 'rebels', as with the Irish Constabulary 
on which it was modelled. Once Maori had been shown 
the futility of resistance to the might of the Crown, the 
new force would superintend the imposition upon them 
of European ways and means of doing and seeing. Moreo-
ver, given recently increased disorder in the urban streets, 
the new police would not just supplement the Police Mag-
istracy force but eventually replace it. It was an Armed 
Police Force that would now handle the 'control of both 
races'. Although ironically the new force would be far 
more ostentatiously coercive than past policing modes 
which the Company settlers had complained about, be-
cause its primary target was Maori there was no opposi-
tion from the settler establishment . 
Indeed, Wellington settlers were generally delighted: 
they no longer needed to constitute in effect a rival sover-
eignty. Their interests and those of the Crown had merged 
now that the balance of military power had changed: 
Maori who still resisted the implications of the accession 
of kawanatanga in New Zealand would see their rival 
power source crushed. A Wellington paper summed up 
feeling in crowing that the advent of an Armed Police 
Force 'must have a great affect in overawing the aborigi-
nal population' . Grey was depicted as the first Governor 
who had shown 'desire to promote the welfare and ad-
vance the interests of the colonists at Port Nicholson' . 
Insofar as pakeha were to be targeted by the Armed Po-
lice Force, these would perceivedly be mostly non-Com-
pany pakeha who had recently been drifting into the 
settlement and who required the application of harsh 
control. 
In April1846 the Armed Police Force was established 
and, significantly, placed in the charge of locally recruited 
officers headed by prominent Company settler David Stark 
Durie- another member of the rival regime of 1840. Fifty-
five men were carefully selected by Grey to be armed 
police, and numbers peaked at 70 later in the year, at 
around the time an 11-man detachment was established 
in Wanganui. In both places one of the first tasks was the 
cleaning up of a burgeoning trade in illegal liquor sales 
which were said to be 'affecting no small portion of the 
community'. Unregulated drinking disrupted public or-
der and rhythms of work, and was all the more important 
to suppress now that sizeable numbers of soldiers were 
based in the Wellington region." 
Over the winter of 1846 Grey sought to conquer 
Ngatitoa and their allies, having established a defensive 
line between Porirua and Upper Hutt. The Armed Police 
Force focused on preventing and mopping up resistance 
south of this line, although it also participated in the 
fighting along and forward of it. A detachment, for exam-
ple, patrolled Karori to prevent incursion into the rear of 
Wellington, while armed police participated in the raids 
that led to the capture of Te Rauparaha and of 
Rangihaeata's pa at Pauatahanui. That August the rebel 
forces under Te Rangihaeata and Te Mamaku withdrew 
to the Manawatu and the Wanganui Valley. Between their 
forces and the settled areas near Cook Strait, settlement 
could expand so long as caution towards the remaining 
Maori prevailed. The Armed Police became the spear-
head for the gradual expansion of the Crown's authority 
up the coast from Porirua. In 1847, indeed, the headquar-
ters of the Wellington police was moved to strategically-
placed Waikanae. 
That same year warfare broke out in the Wanganui 
area. Here too the Armed Police participated in both fight-
ing and post-war pacification in the hinterland. Peace 
was signed with both Te Rangihaeata and Te Mamaku in 
1848, and in case of further disturbance the military garri-
son that remained at Wanganui kept close surveillance of 
the coast. But although a start on changing nominal into 
substantive sovereignty in the region had been made, 
much needed to be done. Grey was determined to do it 
quickly, and the police were an integral part of his plan. 
He had indeed first come to prominence with the imperial 
authorities over a keynote paper that argued - apropos 
Australian Aboriginals- that indigenous subjects should 
be compulsorily assimilated so that they would rapidly 
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become British in fact as well as in name." 
Grey overrode the caution of the authorities in Britain 
who, as with Governors Hobson and FitzRoy, were will-
ing to entertain not only the temporary continuance of 
most Maori customary practices, but also of districts where 
Maori authority and law prevailed. Grey wanted full and 
rapid adoption by Maori of European ways of thinking, 
seeing and doing. He enshrined the existence of the Armed 
Police Force in law in October 1846, and its detachments 
had soon completely superseded the old Police Magis-
tracy Forces. In a parallel development, a new judicial 
agency, the Resident Magistracy, was established. The 
Resident Magistrates, who headed the local state estab-
lishments in the outer areas, were tasked with pushing 
European laws and mores ever further into the country-
side." 
Chiefs were expected to cooperate in this grand en-
deavour. From the beginnings of the first Armed Police 
Force, that in Wellington, and in the others thaf followed 
in Auckland and New Plymouth (the three technically 
policed the entire colony), Maori were enrolled. There 
was already a long history in New Zealand of eo-opting 
Maori, particularly chiefs, into assisting the state, includ-
-.-. . 
ing swearing them in as constables. This had mostly been 
to utilise their specialist knowledge of and control over 
their own tribespeople for reasons relating to intelligence 
and tribal mobilisation in the cause of the state. There was 
still an important element of such thinking behind the 
Maori Armed Police enrolments: most Wellington enroll-
ees were Te Atiawa, including leading 'friendly' chief, Wi 
Tako Ngatata. But Grey's plans were more ambitious than 
those of his predecessors: Maori would learn 'civilised' 
behaviour through chiefs who had been living and work-
ing with pakeha in an intimate fashion - particularly in 
the Armed Police Forces and in the Resident Magistrates' 
establishments. Once they had 'emancipated themselves 
from their former prejudices' they would go back to their 
villages, invigorated by the vast potentialities of 'British 
civilisation', and in turn set about to convert their people 
to the benefits of becoming brown-skinned pakeha.18 
Pay in the Armed Police had been higher than that of 
its predecessors, mostly in order to attract a 'better class' 
of pakeha able to teach the Maori police by example. 
Recruitment in Wellington had, indeed, been among rela-
tively sober tradespeople, a more sophisticated recruiting 
ground than for most colonial police. It was seen as a 
successful experiment. The head of regional po-
lice, Inspector Durie, felt in 1848 that the 'effect 
the Police Service has on the habits and condi-
tions of the Natives is not only apparent,'as far 
as their amelioration is concerned, but is evi-
dent in their cleanliness, smartness, intelligence 
and general bearing, after their period of serv-
ice expires'. Settlers not usually disposed to say 
a kind word about Maori were soon comment-
ing favourably on progress in Europeanising 
the Maori police privates. 19 
But not all was well. One factor militating 
against the civilising influence of police life was 
lack of adequate finance for the police detach-
ments. In particular, the conditions of the po-
lice barracks in which they lived and worked 
was scarcely a civilised environment even by 
colonial standards. Inspector Durie described 
the Wanganui police station as 'a most disrepu-
table hole that attracts the notice of every passer 
by', and the local Resident Magistrate described 
Top left: David Stark Durie, Inspector in charge of 
the New Munster Armed Police Force, photo-
graphed later in life. Wanganui Regional Museum. 
Top right: Te Rauparaha, 1843 (the year of the 
'Wairau affray'). Sketch by John Gilfillan, Alexan-
der Turnbull Library. 
Below: Wanganui, 1841. The original police office 
is above the smoke. Sherrin and Wallace, Early 
History of New Zealand, 1890. 
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it as a 'shed ... so dilapidated as to be unfit for any but 
Maoris' - presumably referring to Maori who had yet to 
be 'civilised' through policing or other state service. The 
NCO's house next to the barracks was a 9 by 10 foot 
structure in such bad repair by 1850 that it had driven 'the 
last corporal of Police to the Public Houses- which led to 
him disgracing himself and the force '. Eventually, with 
the permanently damp barracks in danger of imminent 
collapse, the police had to be given permission to sleep 
away from barracks, the Maori in their pa. This was 
deemed to be 'manifestly to the subversion of all order 
and discipline', but there was no choice. 
Wellington's main police station at Kumutoto, rented 
off Wi Tako himself, was 'unsafe and unhealthy' as a 
result of the Crown's inability to find the money for re-
pairs. When the lockup at Thorndon had fallen into such 
a 'ruinous state' that the prisoners had to be incarcerated 
in the police barracks, non-rostered constables had to try 
and sleep through drunken singing and general distur-
bance. Poor conditions made for a deterioration in polic-
ing standards, especially when coupled with a lessening 
of discipline as a result of headquarters being at Waikanae. 
In fact, former Chief Police Magistrate McDonogh was 
made Sub-Inspector of Police in Wellington town to im-
prove discipline among the men. It was not until1852 that 
the Wellington police gained for the first time relatively 
decent living and working conditions, on Lamb ton Quay. 
But an endemic accommodation problem remained. So 
flimsy were some outlying stations that a report that the 
police station at Paremata had been 'blown down by the 
late boisterous weather' evinced no surprise at all in offi-
cialdom.'• 
Despite all the problems, as early as 1847 'peace and 
good order' were developing so rapidly that the Armed 
Police of Wellington could be reduced to its original com-
plement, and further cuts were to follow. By 1848, in the 
eyes of the Crown an adequate degree of order had been 
imposed on both races in the settled areas of the southern 
North Island. Various assessments refer to a relative 
stabilisation of pakeha society and a considerable better-
ment of race relations. At the beginning of 
the year even the autocratic Governor-in 
Chief Grey was happy to devolve control 
over the state coercive apparatus in the 
southern North Island to Lieutenant-Gover-
nor Edward Eyre, who now had hands-on 
supervision·of all of New Zealand south of a 
line stretching eastwards from the Patea river 
mouth, i.e. over the Province of New Mun-
ster. 
The Wellington settlers had not regret-
ted their decision to set aside their dislike as 
'free citizens' of the sight of armed police in 
the streets, in return both for the protection 
of their persons and property from rogue 
pakeha, and for the Government's new push to get Euro-
peans onto the land in face of Maori resistance. Their 
prospects had not seemed good before this. A recent fall 
in the urban population to below 2,000 had been partly 
caused not just by people leaving to settle on the land but 
also by an outflow born of disillusionment. The 'blue 
jackets are a set of good well-behaved men, much liked 
here', a newcomer noted. By the end of 1848 there was 
said to be 'a comparative absence of any serious cases [of 
crime or disorder] in this province which are not immedi-
ately detected by the vigilance of the police'. All agreed 
that disorder was decreasing wi.thin and between the 
races.21 
This had been assisted by a very high number of po-
lice per head of population in the urban areas where the 
stations were located. There were still26 constables in the 
Wellington urban area alone, together with eight in 
Waikanae, six in Wanganui and two in Porirua. The Wel-
lington-based men doubled as a reserve force, ready at 
immediate notice to travel anywhere in New Munster at 
the potential or actual outbreak of 'disturbance'. This 
high degree of mobility, characteristic of Irish Constabu-
lary-styled forces, was complemented by another feature 
of repressive police: frequent transfer between stations, if 
possible at three monthly intervals. One benefit of this 
was that all police personnel would gain some familiarity 
with the entire region, its terrain and its people, which 
would be useful in the event of expeditions to trouble 
spots . Even more importantly, in this way policemen and 
policed remained strangers to each other, the most appro-
priate circumstance when one is imposing, perhaps down 
the barrel of a gun, discipline upon others. 22 
'ORDER AND TRANQUILLITY' 
The paramilitary 'stranger policing stranger' policing 
mode was, however, expensive to maintain in its classi-
cal, personnel-intensive form. When state decision-mak-
ers assessed- in Eyre' s words- a 'prospect of continued 
tranquillity', it was only a matter of time before modifica-
tion of the police system occurred. By early 1849, with 
10 NEW ZEALAND STUDIES MARCH 1997 
Rangihaeata's defiance from his swampland pa at 
Poroutawhao ended, with settlers poised to move their 
stock into large· areas 'opened up' through Crown pur-
chases from Maori, and with what was seen by the au-
thorities as generally an adequate standard of behaviour 
prevalent in the towns, it was time to modify the policing 
system of the North Island portion of New Munster. 
In the view of the powerful New Munster Colonial 
Secretary Alfred Domett, the practice of rotating occupa-
tion-style police around the various stations was in par-
ticular fast becoming anachronistic. Police were increas-
ingly seen to be most useful to the Crown if they knew the 
land and the people intimately. The expensive 'stranger 
policing stranger' model could now be gradually super-
seded, particularly in the urban areas, by a new and more 
benign modeL Since the targets of policing were increas-
ingly the marginalised with whom police were not sup-
posed to be mixing socially, there were far fewer dangers 
of any 'over-familiarity' with the populace, which was 
believed to lead to dereliction of duty by constables. In 
the first step towards applying the new policing ethos in a 
structural sense, on 1 May 1849 the North Island section 
of the New Munster police was reduced to a total of 27, 
the number of stations reduced, and the periods between 
transfer times greatly increased. 
The now essentially urban-based force was even more 
than before a mobile constabulary needing to be able to 
travel extensively and, in particular, to suppress any pock-
ets of Maori resistance to pakeha expansion or to Euro-
pean codes of behaviour. But the postwar situation had 
led to organisational change in the police interface with 
Maori as welL Most initial Maori Armed Police Force 
members had been selected not only because of their 
specialist know ledge of Maoridom and their assigned roles 
as missionaries of Europeanisation in their tribes, but also 
because they belonged to tribes hostile to the 'insurgents'. 
In the world of the 'stranger policing stranger' syndrome, 
police from one tribe would be readily prepared to disci-
pline, even to kill, men from tribes with which they al-
ready had an adversarial relationship. 
programmed with appropriate attitudes and actions, and 
then in turn both reprogramming their people and disci-
plining those who resisted, remained operative - the 
equivalent in the Maori countryside of the 'like policing 
like' ethos that was coming to prevail in the towns. The 
merging of town and countryside modes of policing can 
be seen in Wanganui in 1850, a town yet to surpass 350 
people. Its entire police complement of privates (three of 
them) were Maori, and because their knowledge ofand 
influence over local Maori was invaluable they ~ere given 
exemption from the need to transfer elsewhere. A year 
later a protest by prominent Hutt settlers about to see 
their sole constable transferred away from the district led 
Governor-in-Chief Grey to sanction transfers at annual 
intervals as a general rule - itself a rule increasingly ob-
served in the breach. 
By 1851 creeping retrenchment including the big cuts 
of 1849 was causing concern among observers and police 
officers alike that the trend towards benign, low-level 
policing had gone too far. That October there were only 
37 police in New Zealand south of the Patea River mouth; 
including in the new planned immigration settlements at 
Canterbury and Otago. The North Island portion of New 
Munster totalled 23 members of the Armed Police Force, 
including eight Maori: 15 in Wellington, one apiece in 
Porirua and the Hutt, four in Wanganui and two at 
Waikanae. So stretched was police coverage that even in 
Wellington Sub-Inspector McDonogh could sometimes 
muster only two men for beat duty at any given time. In 
1852 he was forced through lack of resources to confine 
beats to 'the beach part of the town' from the Thistle Inn 
to Willis Street, leaving two 'great portions of the town, 
viz Thorndon Flat and Te Aro Flat out of the pale of the 
perambulations of the police'. Durie, now Resident Mag-
istrate in Wanganui and in charge of that town's Armed 
Police Force detachment, was lucky if he could spare a 
sole policeman for beat duty at any time.23 
The political authorities acknowledged that the New 
Munster police complement was 'to a certain extent inad-
equate to the exigencies of so extensive a country' . But 
But now the generality of southern North Is- ~-------· 
land Maori were perceived to be pacified, in need 
only of some guidance on how to behave and think 
in a 'civilised' fashion. Maori police were there-
fore increasingly needed mostly for their special-
ist knowledge of their own tribal milieu, and their 
ability to provide firm behavioural guidance to 
their tribespeople. Grey's idea of chiefs becoming 
Opposite: Porirua, 1849. Police stockade. Sketch by 
William Swainson , Alexander Turnbull Library. 
Right: Wanganui ' s new police station and lockup, 
built in 1842 by John Garner. New Zealand Police 
Museum. 
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state coffers remained stretched and, as early as 1849, in 
Grey's assessment (admittedly with an audience of his 
superiors in England, to whom he was inclined to greatly 
exaggerate) 'probably no measure has been so totally suc-
cessful in its results' as the Armed Police Force. Because 
the region's police was able to cope now that a relative 
quietude had descended upon the land, both within and 
between the races, albeit cope in a stretched fashion, the 
men would just have to continue working long hours and 
with little immediate backup. 
On a randomly selected but typical policing day in 
Wellington and the Hlitt in 1851, for example, 10 of the 16 
strong local police complement were rostered on police 
duty (five of the others were carrying out 'necessary sub-
sidiary duties' required by the political authorities, while 
one was off sick). The lone Hutt private patrolled when-
ever he could. The Armed Police Force concept of duty 
was particularly hard on sole charge police: 'Constables 
being always liable to be called on to preserve the peace 
of the Town, are in one sense never off duty unless they 
have express leave of absence for a given time' - a very 
rare thing in these circumstances. On that day in 1851 
seven privates patrolled the Wellington streets. Three of 
these covered 'daytime beats' from Barn- 1pm and 6-Spm, 
and were back on duty for the midnight to 4am night 
watch. The other four took the 1-6pm daily watch; two of 
these went out with the sergeant on the 8pm to midnight 
beats, one on the 4-8am night watch. Sub-Inspector 
McDonogh made surprise supervisory visits at 1pm and 
10.30pm. 
Such visits were integral to beat policing, but were the 
more necessary in Wellington at that time given a de-
crease in the calibre of recruits, a consequence of a recent 
falling behind of pay rates relative to both rising prices 
and to increases in wages in other sectors. The new men 
who were signing on for the yearly contracts were alleg-
edly allowing Wellington to turn into a 'vortex of dissipa-
tion' while they lounged around on street corners joking 
with prostitutes. Worse, Sub-Inspector McDonogh was in 
despair over his lack of resources. He had previously 
been removed from officialdom as a result of his gam-
bling-induced financial entanglements, but reinstated be-
cause of his policing knowledge. He now retreated to his 
old vices, lowering morale by begging, borrowing and 
even stealing from his men to maintain his gambling 
addiction - a matter on which, in a paramilitary force of 
rigid chain-of-command discipline, the subordinate po-
lice were reluctant to act. There was such a general feeling 
of crisis in the policing of the New Munster provincial 
capital that Grey himself began to investigate. Then in 
October 1852 most of the Wellington policemen risked 
'severe punishment' under their military-styled regula-
tions by striking for decent pay- the first strike by sworn 
police personnel in the country's history (and one of the 
few ever). 
Although he considered the strike heinous in the ex-
treme, Grey appreciated that retention of a set of police 
with some experience was preferable to a new group of 
inexperienced men from what would be dubious back-
grounds given the current pay rates; he was also acutely 
aware that something was terribly wrong at the top of the 
Force. So negotiations with the strikers took place and led 
to a return to work. Sub-Inspector McDonogh, humiliated 
by these experiences and under renewed investigation, 
went to pieces. He drank even more than usual, stole the 
entire police pay packet, gambled it away and then killed 
himself. 
His successor, Richard Baker, was as forthright in his 
assessment that retrenchment had gone too far - that 
'order and tranquillity' remained quite some way from 
being fully established, and so more police were needed . 
He sought, for example, more constables so that police 
could 'protect the .. . unprotected parts of this straggling 
town' by extending the beats through Thorndon to the 
'Kaiwarra Road' in one direction, and in the other through 
Te Aro to Mount Cook gaol. This request was to no avail. 
With the age of representative and provincial govern-
ment almost upon the colony it would be up to the Wel-
lington Provincial Government to put in place its own 
policing regime commensurate with what it could afford 
-and that is another story altogether." 
CONCLUSION 
Police Sub-Inspector Baker, who went on to head the 
Wellington Province Police, was the same Major Baker 
who had been the 'Police Magistrate' in the illegal New 
Zealand Company rival government of 1840, a reflection 
of the degree to which the two centres of European power 
in the region were now well and truly fused. Finally, with 
the establishment of the Province on 1 October 1853, the 
settler elite could get their hands on at least a devolved 
degree of sovereignty. But by now, as we have seen, they 
had long since ceased to be viewed by the Crown authori-
ties as aspirants to a rival sovereignty- with good reason, 
for a more sizeable role in governance was satisfactory 
enough for most of them. 
To a lesser degree the Crown had ceased to regard 
Maori as antagonists to Crown sovereignty. But here the 
state authorities were blinkered by the apparent success 
of those 'rapid amalgamation' policies in which the police 
had played a prominent part. Although Maori were 
militarily quiescent and those within the purview of Eu-
ropean settlement were taking up pakeha ways of doing 
things, in general tribal leaders had not abandoned their 
aspirations for meaningful exercise of the rangatiratanga 
they had been promised under the Treaty. Even those 
who had felt that this was compatible with the Crown's 
exercise of kawanatanga were becoming disillusioned. 
The leading 'friendly' chief in Wellington, the chiefly po-
liceman Wi Tako, was a saddened man by the end of the 
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Crown Colony period. He had sought to meld Maori and 
European ways so successfully that even when a fellow 
Maori policeman was caught having an affair with his 
wife he forebore to take out customary Maori utu. Instead 
he presented the situation to the European legal system, 
which treated it as a criminal matter. The culprit was 
incarcerated, then sacked from his job and despatched up 
north. 
By 1853 Wi Tako was of the opinion that he and his 
people had received few quid pro quos for their coopera-
tion with the pakeha. Inspector Durie had described him 
as 'one of the most intelligent and energetic, as well as 
one of the best conducted Maoris in the district'. This 
related to his willingness to collaborate with the policies 
of 'amalgamation', but it took no heed of the reciprocity 
Wi Tako expected, namely the preservation of Te Atiawa's 
rangatiratanga. When the Crown behaved badly over a 
land sale he complained bitterly: 'You buy as much as 
you can of our lands and then you try to chea f us out of 
the rest.' In 1853, the year that Grey declined to establish 
any of the Native Districts allowed for in the new consti-
tution, Wi Tako took a significant role in deliberations at 
Otaki which promoted the Maori King movement, itself 
soon to become another centre of rival sovereignty. 
The wars which resulted in the 1860s did not directly 
affect most of the Wellington region, but are clearly linked 
thematically with the struggle for control in the early 
Wellington settlements. In colonial New Zealand, war 
was virtually inevitable sooner or later, giveri the incom-
patibility of Crown and Maori aspirations with regard to 
sovereignty. The ramifications of this incompatibility had 
potentially been particularly severe in Wellington because 
of the proactive presence of the third rival sovereignty, 
the New Zealand Company. The fact that warfare in the 
region proved to be limited and ephemeral can partly be 
ascribed to the Crown policing officials' early efforts to 
mediate between the other two rival sovereignties. It also 
resulted from the ongoing efforts of the police to impose 
what the government defined as 'peace and tranquillity' 
upon those of both races who resisted. Despite all the 
problems, the police system of early Wellington had 
worked well in its pursuit of state aspirations.25 
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